Doxazo Theos

Theistic Conceptualism

June 25th, 2009

A version of theistic conceptualism can be distilled by conjoining three independently defensible theses, where ‘objects of kind F‘ are those typically characterized as abstract (numbers, properties, propositions, etc.):

Necessary Existence Thesis: There are necessarily existent objects of kind F

One over Many Thesis: Objects of kind F are tokenable types

Conceptualism Simpliciter: Objects of kind F are mental (conceptual) particulars

The resultant thesis would be very appealing. On the one hand, it would welcome many of the strongest realist arguments in favor of the Necessary Existence Thesis. On the other hand, Conceptualism Simpliciter would accommodate many strong nominalist strategies by avoiding commitment to a bloated or tripartite ontology of abstract objects. This is to say nothing of the merit of the actual arguments for the theses themselves, which I think are a good many.

Of course, many peoples’ strongest motivation for resisting this line would be that the resultant thesis would be explicitly theistic, where objects of kind F are grounded in a necessarily existent mind. But that’s not my problem.

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Virtual Identity = Reality?

May 28th, 2009

Fictional objects, like characters and virtual worlds and their contents (e.g., vorpal swords), do not exist and are not considered objects because they do not possess a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. They are, to use Vallicella’s term, incomplete items.

Take any fictional item F. Nothing seems impossible about some master-author or programmer (call him Dr. Pruss) exhaustively describing or programming a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions for F. So we can say there is a possible world W where F does in fact have a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. So, is F a fiction in W?

Further, suppose Dr. Pruss was only able to program F in W by modeling it off his exhaustive knowledge of a real F in W, F’. In essence, F is an exact replica of F’, only F is virtual and F’ is actual, or real. It’s not like we can just say F≠F’ because it is false that (F)(F’)[(F=F’)→(α)(αF↔αF’)] where α is actual existence because the question is precisely why α applies to F’ and not F in W.

The only sensible answer I can think to give would be to say F is abstract whereas F’ is concrete in W. But if that’s the case, then the only way one can maintain that F≠F’ in W (without denying ◊F) would be to affirm the existence of abstract objects.

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Boomerang Arguments

May 11th, 2009

A boomerang argument, according to Robert Van Gulick,

reaches across to the epistemic/cognitive/conceptual domain of facts about our representation of the world, and then swings back to reach a conclusion in the metaphysical/ontological/factual domain about the nature of reality itself. It moves from the facts about how we represent or conceptualize the world to suppose results about the necessary nature of the world itself. More specifically, boomerangs often move from supposed gaps or lacks of links in our representations or concepts of the world to conclusion about objects gaps within the world itself and ontological distinctions between the real things in it.¹

Boomerang arguments have a long and detailed history. Among the more classic examples are ontological arguments for God’s existence and various arguments for dualism. More contemporary examples include Jackson’s Mary,² Nagel’s bat,³ and Chalmers’ zombie.⁴ (I want very badly to see a paper entitled “A Zombie Bat Named Mary,” or maybe just an article about a Mary with a pet zombie bat, or a zombie named Mary with a pet bat?) One might also include indispensability arguments in mathematics. According to Mitchell O. Stokes,⁵ two of the most influential indispensability arguments, Quine and Putnam’s⁶ and van Inwagen’s,⁷ incorporate something like the following normative principle (NP):

(NP) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence, even if only in principle

The crucial thing to be worked out in (NP) is the idea of adequate replacement. Reductive paraphrases are a dime a dozen and can be offered for almost anything. However, this fact should not be taken to mean that they are at all adequate or preferable to the original expression. To show a paraphrase is inadequate, you could either (1) provide a counterexample to it that demonstrates the reduction or elimination is not successful, or (2) argue that it is counterintuitive, or at least more counterintuitive than the original. (2) is at odds with (IP). If (2) is true, then even if a paraphrase is coherent or available in principle, it still might be that one shouldn’t accept the paraphrase. (2) would not likely sway reductionists, but I think it’s a strategy that could, if employed correctly, permit rational assent to the original expression and possibly even give a burden of proof to the reductionist.

That said, here is another possible boomerang argument that utilizes (IP). Call it an indispensability argument for objective morality:

(1) Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)

(2) We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts

(3) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence

(4) Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.

(5) If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts

(6) We should believe in moral facts

And, of course, if this boomerang argument is sound, you can then throw an argument from objective morality that has a theistic spin.
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Cheyne on a Modal Argument for Numbers

April 15th, 2009

Colin Cheyne’s Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects (Kluwer, 2001) is perhaps the finest development of the epistemological objection to Platonism to date. As such, the project of the book is fundamentally epistemological, and that’s where its strengths are. But Cheyne’s handling of the modal argument for the necessary existence of abstract objects is regrettably superficial. Skeptical of modal arguments for necessarily existent entities, Cheyne outlines one for numbers (N):

(N1) ◊ (∃x)Nx

(N2) □ ((∃x)Nx ⊃ □ (∃x)Nx)

∴ (N3) □ (∃x)Nx

∴ (N4) (∃x)Nx

and complains that “if the above argument is sound, then so is the following parallel argument for the existence of number-excluders” (106). Number-excludes (E), according to this parody, are “entities that exist necessarily, if they exist at all, and whose existence in a world excludes the existence of numbers in that world”:

(E1) ◊ (∃x)Ex

(E2) □ ((∃x)Ex ⊃ □ (∃x)Ex)

∴ (E3) □ (∃x)Ex

∴ (E4) (∃x)Ex

And because (N4) and (E4) cannot both be true, one of the arguments must be unsound. Now, the realist’s reply is readily at hand, which would simply be to deny (E1). Cheyne tries to preempt this, conceding that “there might be some queasiness concerning such weird entities as number-excluders,” but adds that “although it is difficult to see on what grounds someone could insist that they are a logical impossibility whilst numbers are not” (107). But there’s no difficulty here at all. Just ask yourself how many number-excluders there possibly are. Presumably, however many numbers they are excluding, which would be an infinite amount! (Recall Neil Tennant’s argument that propositions such as “There are n Fs” and “The number of Fs is n” incur ontological commitment) In other words, if (E1) is true it proves (N1). But if (N1) is true, then (E1) is necessarily false. Therefore, (E1) is logically impossible and the first argument passes. But Cheyne has a second argument against the first. Cheyne notes that

(N’) ◊ ~(∃x)Nx

(N3) is logically equivalent to the negation of (N’):

(N3^≡) ~◊ ~(∃x)Nx

the problem being that “now (N3), and hence (N3^≡), follows from (N1) and (N2). So, (N1) and (N’) cannot both be true, at least if (N2) is true.” But this is just false. Both (N3^≡) and (N’) are irrelevant to the first argument. (N3^≡) has no relevant consequences and (N’) is not the negation of (N1). Cheyne has confused the modal negation

(Q) ◊ ~p (possibly not-p)

which is representative of his (N’), with

(P) ~◊ p (not-possibly p)

the proper structure of the negation of (N1), which would be represented

(N”) ~◊ (∃x)Nx

Only (P) yields the proper negation of (N1), (N”), which is logically equivalent to (N3^≡). Once this defect is remedied, what follows from (N”)? At this point, the realist can quite rightly turn the tables on Cheyne, insisting that “‘it is difficult to see on what grounds someone could insist that [(N”) is] a logical impossibility whilst numbers are not.’” The only possible support for (N”) would be something like (E1), which we already saw didn’t work. Interestingly, if numbers are grounded in God, and there is a sound modal ontological argument for God’s existence, we should be able to parallel a modal ontological argument for abstract objects. A possible difficulty facing such a parallel argument would be how the modal relationship between God and abstract objects is spelled out.

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The Trinity and Axiology

April 10th, 2009

An argument outlined earlier, which I think is a good one, has axiological implications which beg to be explored. Recall Morris’s Endowment Thesis:

(ET) Something has meaning iff it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

According to (ET), that which is endowed is meaning, but I think it could be equally true of purpose or value. So we can broaden (ET) by replacing meaning M with either purpose P or value V, or conjoining all three as MPV, respectively:

(ET’) Something has MPV iff it is endowed with MPV by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

and the rest of the argument follows:

(2) There is a possible world W where S exists alone

(3) S is has MPV in W

(4) Therefore, S is endowed with MPV by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents in W

(5) A single, purposive personal agent cannot endow itself with MPV

(6) Therefore, S is not endowed with MPV by a single, purposive personal agent in W

(7) Therefore, S is endowed with MPV by a group of purposive, personal agents in W

(8) Therefore, S is composed of personal purposive agents in W

The argument could be criticized on grounds that (ET’) leaves no room for intrinsic MPV. Surely there is a such a thing as intrinsic MPV, and if there is any candidate worthy of intrinsic MPV, it would be God. Here’s a possible solution. First make some simple mereological distinctions. It can be plausibly held that the Trinity has properties in virtue of its members and each member has properties in virtue of being part of the Trinity:

For parts can possess properties which the whole does not, and the whole can have a property because some part has it. Thus, when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent; rather God has these properties because the persons do. Divine attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness are grounded in the persons’ possessing these properties, while divine attributes like necessity, aseity, and eternity are not so grounded. With respect to the latter, the persons have these properties because God as a whole has them. For parts can have some properties in virtue of the wholes of which they are parts (Craig & Moreland, “A Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity” from Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview [InterVarsity Press, 2003]).

The application is that the Trinity as a whole could have intrinsic MPV in relation to its members. An immediate objection to this would be to say this is not an instance of intrinsic MPV. A fairly standard account of an intrinsic property is

(IP) P is an intrinsic property = _df P is intrinsic to some object x if x’s having P is not dependent on the existence, or non-existence, of a distinct object y

Because the Trinity (say, x) depends on its members (say, y) for MPV, MPV cannot be an intrinsic property of the Trinity. If (IP) is true, then this is indisputable. But as it stands, (IP) is not precise enough. The problem is with the word ‘dependent’. There are different kinds of dependency relations, and not all need be dismissed ex hypothesi with respect to (IP). (IP) could be relaxed or strengthened by specifying an appropriate dependency relation between x and y to secure P. The type of dependency relations inconsistent with intrinsic properties are ontological, asymmetrical ones. But some relations, such as supervenience, are much tighter than this, which could appropriately ground intrinsic properties between objects. P could supervene on x as a result of x’s relationship to y. In fact, it has been directly argued that intrinsic value is grounded not in properties simpliciter, but relational properties such as supervenient ones (see especially Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value” The Journal of Ethics 2 [1998], pp. 277-287). So a better though still rough account of intrinsic value would be

(IP’) P is an intrinsic property = _df P is intrinsic to some object x if x’s having P is not ontologically dependent on the existence, or non-existence, of a distinct object y

So intrinsic MPV could supervene on the Trinity as a result its members. But even if that’s possible, it remains to explained how, especially in light of the mereological relationship of the Trinity. Here I would pass the buck to a more able philosopher, who could no doubt articulately utilize the insights in Jonas Olson’s “Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism about Final Value” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004), pp. 31-52, a virtual gold-mine for just this question.

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An Argument for Conceptualism

April 7th, 2009

Perhaps the widely accepted distinction between abstracta and concreta is fundamentally misguided and has overshadowed an illuminating fact about the nature of entities of the former kind (numbers, properties, propositions, etc.). Letting F represent such entities, (or objects, no distinction is being drawn here), a simple argument for conceptualism might run as follows:

(1) Fs are either abstract or concrete entities

(2) Fs are not abstract entities

(3) Therefore, Fs are concrete entities

(4) If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical or conceptual particulars

(5) Fs are not physical particulars

(6) Therefore, Fs are conceptual particulars

The two important premises are (2) and (5). (4) is actually uncontroversial, because mental events, states, etc. are almost always understood as particulars (though I suppose this would need some explanation). (5) might bring some resistance from hard-core empiricists or physicalists, but nothing I don’t think can be overcome. What about (2)? Here are some strategies. First, you could argue that all accounts that have tried to offer a distinction between abstract and concrete fail. Second, (2) might offer a simpler ontology and avoid, at a single stroke, all the arguments against abstract objects (thus welcoming many anti-realist or anti-platonist strategies aimed at objects so conceived). Third, you could apply an identity criterion to certain objects, turning them into particulars. Hale notes this:

For suppose Fs to be incapable of spatial location. A fortiori it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. Thus Fs are not abstract, but concrete. This particular objection could be silenced by amending the criterion to: Fs are concrete objects if and only if a is the same F as b only if a and b enjoy the same spatial location at any time. But this suffers from the opposite defect: for we shall surely wish to regard mental events, states, etc. as concrete objects, but will now only be able to do so by insisting upon the truth of physicalism (Abstract Objects [Basil Blackwell, 1987], p. 57).

Hale completely overlooks conceptualism as an option to solve this dilemma. A conceptualist needn’t conced anything to physicalism. However, this latter strategy would cause some difficulties for exemplification (how can redness, as a particular, be instantiated in multiple objects?). But this could be easily resolved by seeing Fs not as particulars, but universal concepts, which could be multiply instantiated (say, by an omniscient mind). Slightly altering the premises, then:

(4’) If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical particulars or universal concepts

(6’) Therefore, Fs are universal concepts

And here we would have not only an argument for conceptualism, but a conceptualist argument for God.

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Degrees of Ontological Commitment

April 5th, 2009

Three terms can be used to indicate degrees of ontological commitment: item, entity, and object. ‘Item’ is ontologically neutral or noncommittal, whereas both entity and object are committal but in different ways. This is not to say things can exist in degrees; it is only to indicate with precision one’s ontological commitment to the thing in question. E. J. Lowe defines ‘object’ as an entity possessing determinate identity conditions. By ‘determinate identity conditions,’ I think Lowe means a complete set of compossible properties. So an ‘object’ is an entity possessing a complete set of compossible properties. Waves and particles, for example, would not be considered objects under this definition because they lack determinate identity conditions. Certain quantum phenomena indicate that particles can exemplify contradictory properties simultaneously. And because waves undergo constant flux, no one wave can exist at two times. Determinate identity conditions also rule out fuzzy, vague, or incomplete items as objects as well. William Vallicella defines an incomplete item as follows:

X is incomplete =_df there is a property F-ness such that x is neither F nor non-F.

Vallicella adds that “an incomplete item, then, is one that is indeterminate with respect to one or more properties.” An incomplete item would be something like a fictional character or concept, because they only have properties predicated of them by their creators (E.g., What is Homer Simpson’s shoe size?) Properties not predicated of fictional characters have no truth value, and so cannot have identity conditions. Given that incomplete items are indeterminate, they cannot be objects. But incomplete items could be entities. The difference between a fictional item and an incomplete entity is actual existence. It is therefore convenient to define ‘entity’ simpliciter as that which exists but does not have determinate identity conditions.

In sum, all entities and objects are necessarily items, but all items are not necessarily entities or objects. Moreover, all objects are entities, but not all entities are objects. Existence is a necessary condition for entities and objects, but only a sufficient condition for items. The next step would be applying these distinctions to abstract and concrete items.

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Omnipresence

March 18th, 2009

One way of understanding omnipresence suggests God is present everywhere throughout or within space. Let’s call this omnispatial presence. A definition could be:

(OP) S is omnispatially present iff for any spatial point p, S is fully present at or in p

Typical objections to (OP) involve various problems with spatialization. For example, it is difficult to understand how it is that S can be just as fully present at or in two different spatial points, p₁ and p₂, where p₁ is infinitesimal and p₂ could be as large as the universe (space) itself. This is not a difficulty if we explain “being fully present” at or in micro-points p₁—p_n in virtue of being fully present at or in a single, all-encompassing large-scale spatial frame p*, such as the universe (space) itself. The problem with this is that p* is either spatially finite or infinite. If p* is finite, so is S’s presence. Moreover, if p* undergoes change in scale, so does S. On Christian theism, p* is always finite. On either a relational or a substantive construal of p*, p* is finite. One last escape route would be to say that (OP) is an accidental property only. In the absence of any spatial points at all, S is not omnipresent. This seems fair enough (for now).

In his paper “God and Spacelessness,” Paul Helm develops several such objections to conceptions of omnipresence akin to (OP) in more detail (in Cahn and Shatz [eds.], Contemporary Philosophy of Religion [Oxford, 1982], pp. 99-110). More recently is Hud Hudson’s treatment of omnipresence, where he enumerates six similar problems (“Omnipresence” in Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology [Oxford, 2009], pp. 199-216):

The problem of simplicity – how can something that is not mereologically composite occupy more than one region?
The problem of multilocation – how can something occupy (in the „wholly present‟ sense) two numerically distinct regions?
The problem of containment – if to occupy a region is to be contained by it, how can something that is essentially free of the constraints that bind all creaturely things occupy a region?
The problem of timelessness – how can something occupy a region and be atemporal?
The problem of incorporeality – how can something occupy a region and fail to have a body?
The problem of co-location – how can two numerically distinct things each occupy the same region?

To be fair, Ishtiyaque Haji does a decent job of defending omnispatiality against Helm’s objections in his “God and Omnispatiality” (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 25:2 [1989], pp. 99-108) and Hudson goes on to ingeniously solve each of the problems he lists. But it seems to me that even if (OP) can be coherently defended there is still a reason to reject it. To see it, consider a different way to understand omnipresence. Rather than being in or throughout space, perhaps omnipresence would be better thought of as transcending or being beyond space altogether. We can call this aspatial presence (AP). A definition would be:

(AP) S is aspatially present iff for any spatial point p, S is conscious of and possibly causally active at or in p

Of course if S is aspatial, then the word “present” does not describe S but S’s relationship to p. Moreover, this relationship would be a logical one, not a spatial one. The reason for rejecting (OP) now would be that, apart from problems with incorporeality (which any acceptable conception of omnipresence must face), (AP) can give us everything (OP) can while effectively avoiding all the difficulties of spatialization. Unless the defender of (OP) can give us a good reason for thinking, say, any relationship between S and p need be spatial, (OP) is a completely gratuitous attribute. I can’t think of any problems with (AP). Can anyone else?

Posted in Attributes of God, Philosophical Theology | 6 Comments »

The Tow Truck Paradox

February 25th, 2009

Imagine a circle of tow trucks, each one towing the truck behind it. This paradoxical concept has plagued my thoughts for some time, ever since I doodled such an image in a notebook one day. If each tow truck is towing the one behind it, with the series of trucks forming a circle, are any tow trucks being towed?

To answer that question, we must be a bit more clear about the nature of the situation. What do we mean by towing? Let’s just say (1) there has to be at least one active and one passive member in the series, and (2) each member has to be in motion.

Mechanically speaking, the cable from each posterior truck is lifting the front of each prior truck, assuming each truck has back-wheel drive. Or we could say that the cable from each posterior truck is elevating the back of each one prior, allowing for front wheel-drive action (a possible but unnecessary and queer scenario, so we’ll just assume the former instead). Otherwise, the entire circle of tow trucks would be stationary, in which case there would be no towing going-ons (towing-ons?).

It is tempting to answer the question by noting that each tow truck is being towed by the one in front of it. But transitivity eliminates this answer. It may well be true that tow truck 1 is being pulled by tow truck 2. But 2 can tow 1 only because 2 is being towed by 3. The towing action of 2 is transitive. It occurs only because 2 is towed by 3. The towing of 1 is owed to the towing action of 3. But the towing of 3 is due, as would be 1, to the towing action of 4, and so on. Obviously this doesn’t settle the problem because we are yet to identify at least one active member in the series. By an active member I mean an initiator or source of motion to pass the towing. Without at least one such member, the series will remain stationary. And given that the series is circular, the motion of the series as a whole must be uniform (relative to the speed of the initiator or driving force).

Let’s say the back-wheel drive feature of at least one tow truck is what accounts for the motion of the series as a whole. But now it seems that the uniform motion of the series as a whole would render the towing of a single initiator superfluous. For we could say with equal force that the initiator is being towed rather than towing, in which case we’d have the odd situation where conditions (1) and (2) are met but still no towing-ons.

What if each tow truck is its own initiator, moving uniformly relative to each other? This suggestion does nothing because it fails to meet condition (1) for towing-ons, given that there aren’t any passive members in the series.

How about if we make every other tow truck an initiator, leaving a passive member between each active member? The problem with this is similar to the problem in the first scenario; each active member becomes transitive if the motion of the series is uniform. We are left trying to identify a single initiator responsible amongst every other one to account for the motion of the series as a whole. But if there is a single initiator, we have the second suggestion all over again.

Should we conclude, then, that when you have a circle of tow trucks, each one towing the truck behind it, no tow truck is actually towing or being towed? Nothing in the scenario seems physically impossible, and therefore not logically impossible. Neither is it obviously a case of circular causation. When I picture the scenario, however, it is hard for me to conclude there is no towing-ons—for I can clearly see lots of it (presumably as much as there are members in the series). I’m sure that if presented with this picture, most everyone’s intuitions would say the same. If the towing intuition is defeasible, which part of the analysis went amiss (does it involve circular causation? a dubious, unsophisticated account of transitivity?)? The paradox is that conditions (1) and (2) intuitively capture the act of towing but, when applied to our scenario, are intuitively but not logically met.

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Another Argument for the Trinity?

February 8th, 2009

In a series of earlier posts I’ve tried to outline a coherent statement of the Trinity, following that with a plausible philosophical argument for it based on the essentiality of omnibenevolence. Here’s a second possible philosophical argument for the trinity. First, recall what Thomas V. Morris calls the Endowment Thesis (ET):

(ET) Something has meaning iff it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

I suggested (ET) is false on the grounds of stipulating the possibility of a personal being fitting the following definition, proposed by Richard Swinburne:

(ON) A being is ontologically necessary iff there is not at any time any cause, either active or permissive, of its everlasting existence

Such a being would be intrinsically valuable and thereby escape the need to be endowed meaning. One could try to escape this objection by claiming an ontologically necessary being could endow itself with meaning or significance. But the act of endowing oneself meaning or significance presents the following dilemma: Either the act of endowing is necessary or it is not. If so, then this would need to be spelled out in more detail (e.g., in what sense would the act be necessary? Besides, Christian theism has always maintained that God’s actions are free in the most robust libertarian sense). If not, then the being is possibly not meaningful or significant, which is untenable for obvious reasons.

But further thought shows that (ET) and (ON) are not necessarily inconsistent. Before, I was assuming the word ‘cause’ in (ON) could be used synonymously with ‘explanation’, or ‘reason’, which is precisely what we mean by ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’. It follows from that assumption that (ET) and (ON) are inconsistent, for an ontologically necessary being is such that there is not at any time any cause (reason, explanation, meaning, significance), either active or permissive, of its existence. But if we understand ‘cause’ here as strictly efficient, which I think is best (as implied by the being not having one, active or permissive), then we are not at liberty to use those words as synonyms. If an ontologically necessary being is intrinsically valuable, such would not be stipulated by (ON).

The problem could be redressed by finding something like (ON) that would be inconsistent with (ET). Some form of the principle of sufficient reason might do the trick:

(PSR) Anything that exists has an explanation either a se or ab alio

(PSR) does with the word ‘explanation’ exactly what I originally thought (ON) did with the word ‘cause’. Or does it? Does having an explanation in oneself entail being intrinsically meaningful or significant? It seems not. To see why, consider the universe as an ontologically necessary being, where its explanation is in itself. Even so, apart from the endowments of one or more purposive personal agents, the universe would lack meaning. It would just be, and that’s all. We could say the same of a personal ontologically necessary being. In other words, (PSR) also makes no pronouncements on a being’s meaning or significance, so is not inconsistent with (ET).

Suppose you’re strongly inclined to accept both (ET) and (ON). Though they are not inconsistent, you’re left with having to explain how an ontologically necessary being can be endowed meaning or significance by another personal agent or group of such agents. One way to do this (perhaps the only way) would be to accept Christian theism and maintain there is a plurality of persons in an ontologically necessary being. Where S is understood as an ontologically necessary being, a rough sketch of the argument would look something like this:

(1) Something has meaning iff it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

(2) There is a possible world W where S exists alone

(3) S is has meaning and significance in W

(4) Therefore, S is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents in W

(5) A single, purposive personal agent cannot endow itself with meaning and significance

(6) Therefore, S is not endowed with meaning or significance by a single, purposive personal agent

(7) Therefore, S is endowed with meaning or significance by a group of purposive, personal agents

(8) Therefore, S is composed of personal purposive agents

That this is an argument for the trinity is somewhat of a misnomer—there is nothing about the argument that designates S be composed of exactly three purposive personal agents. The main point is the conjunction of (ET) and (ON) could have at least non-unitarian implications.

Posted in Christian Doctrine, Philosophical Theology | 4 Comments »

(1)	Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)
(2)	We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts
(3)	We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence
(4)	Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.
(5)	If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts
(6)	We should believe in moral facts

	(N1)	◊ (∃x)Nx
	(N2)	□ ((∃x)Nx ⊃ □ (∃x)Nx)
∴	(N3)	□ (∃x)Nx
∴	(N4)	(∃x)Nx

	(E1)	◊ (∃x)Ex
	(E2)	□ ((∃x)Ex ⊃ □ (∃x)Ex)
∴	(E3)	□ (∃x)Ex
∴	(E4)	(∃x)Ex

(2)	There is a possible world W where S exists alone
(3)	S is has MPV in W
(4)	Therefore, S is endowed with MPV by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents in W
(5)	A single, purposive personal agent cannot endow itself with MPV
(6)	Therefore, S is not endowed with MPV by a single, purposive personal agent in W
(7)	Therefore, S is endowed with MPV by a group of purposive, personal agents in W
(8)	Therefore, S is composed of personal purposive agents in W

(1)	Fs are either abstract or concrete entities
(2)	Fs are not abstract entities
(3)	Therefore, Fs are concrete entities
(4)	If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical or conceptual particulars
(5)	Fs are not physical particulars
(6)	Therefore, Fs are conceptual particulars

(4’)	If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical particulars or universal concepts
(6’)	Therefore, Fs are universal concepts

(1)	Something has meaning iff it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents
(2)	There is a possible world W where S exists alone
(3)	S is has meaning and significance in W
(4)	Therefore, S is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents in W
(5)	A single, purposive personal agent cannot endow itself with meaning and significance
(6)	Therefore, S is not endowed with meaning or significance by a single, purposive personal agent
(7)	Therefore, S is endowed with meaning or significance by a group of purposive, personal agents
(8)	Therefore, S is composed of personal purposive agents

Doxazo Theos

Chad McIntosh

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