So if there are semantic ambiguities, it’s by the use of the word ‘thing.’ Logical distinctions arise when we distinguish between two more kinds of things. The most basic distinction among beings is that property and substance. Some philosophers have argued for a third type of being that is needed if one is to have an ontology resourceful enough to make proper distinctions among every existing thing, called property-things (a.k.a. ordered aggregates, structured stuff, bare matter).

If you grab an intro philosophy text it will likely have a chapter on general ontology, which would provide more details.

Ben:
I agree that is there is an all loving god, then he love would be so central to the divine nature that he would choose to create. That would be the only thing it would make sense for a loving god to do– create life.

“Wouldn’t it be more benevolent to love someone or something totally other than itself? Other than something it stands in an identical relationship with?”

The problem with this notion is that if one measures love in regard to proportion or distinctiveness of the ones loved. Then one might imagine an infinitely ascending scale of new beings and more beings that could be recipients of this love. Love so defined would not and could not ever reach the “omni” status. Perfect love at least on some level has to be understood to be perfect on the hypothetical level (i.e. if being X existed then being X would be the recipient of perfect love from God). God doesn’t necessisarily have to generate being X in order to ascend to the omnibenevolent status.

One might imagine though that a being so full of love probably isn’t content to keep love interpersonal (literally in this instance, between the personalities entailed therin). This lends itself to an understanding of why God might have created… specifically why He might have made humanity with the dreadful ability to choose the relationship with God over self-love.

I guess my question would be why does the omnibenevolent being need to BE three persons? The perfect, omnibenevolent being would perhaps most obviously show its perfection by expressing its benevolence among more than one, simple “other” but how is it necessary that the being be COMPOSED of at least three persons?

This is a great question; very perceptive on that assumption! The reason why there has to be a single divine being (though I prefer the word nature—see my earlier post on the Trinity to see why) composed of three persons is because it is ontologically impossible to have more than one divine being. A perfect being would exist of ontological necessity; that is, would be such that there is no cause active or permissive of its existence at any time. But as Swinburne points out, if such a being “is the creator and sustainer of any universe there may be, any other substance can only exist if he is, at least in part, the cause of its existence. Hence there cannot be …another such.” (Richard Swinburne, The Christian God [Oxford, 1994], 170). But no such problem looms for one ontologically necessary being composed of three persons.

Especially if all three persons share an identity? Wouldn’t it be more benevolent to love someone or something totally other than itself? Other than something it stands in an identical relationship with? And wouldn’t all three of those persons share an identical omnibenevolence? How benevolent is it to love an identically omnibenevolent being?

These are excellent questions to ask unitarian conceptions of the Trinity (modalism, monarchianism, or sabellianism), which depict a strict identity between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The three are really a single being who assumes one of the three titles depending on the role he steps into. But the model of the Trinity I’m assuming (linked to above) has each member of the Trinity a distinct individual and therefore not identical. Each member has their own center of consciousness, counting them as distinct persons. You ask the fascinating question, “Wouldn’t all three of those persons share an identical omnibenevolence?” I would say not, for the Father’s love would be distinct from the Son’s love and the Holy Spirit’s love, and so on. Each person’s love, by itself, is not perfect. But because of the tripartite unity of each members’ love, the single divine nature exemplifies the property of omnibenevolence.

I’m not Catholic (in the traditional sense of the word), but I’ll look into Kolbe’s theory. I appreciate the reference and great comments!

Most of those questions are totally rhetorical, and I think you could make perfectly sensible arguments in response. I’m thinking along the lines that any one of those beings could not even BE omnibenevolent without an other that it eternally relates to. As for the question of loving an other who is not benevolent being the ultimate show of benevolence, well, that covers a triune God taking on the task of creation.

I don’t know if you’re Catholic or not, but there’s an interesting book about Maximillian Kolbe’s theory of the trinity entitled “Immaculate Conception and the Holy Spirit” that deals with some trinitarian issues.

Cool post.