Doxazo Theos

Archive for May, 2008

The Suicide Argument

Monday, May 26th, 2008

In The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus famously remarked that “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide”. Camus later reasoned that because suicide amounts to using your freedom to take away our freedom, one should rationally opt against it. Camus’ reasoning resurfaces in what Thomas V. Morris has dubbed The Suicide Argument:

(1) I should rid the world of bad things, so far as it is in my control to do so

(2) An utterly absurd and meaningless life is a bad thing

(3) My life is utterly absurd and meaningless

(4) It is within my control to rid the world of my life

(5) Thus, I should rid the world of my life

The starting premise seems true, at least as a prima facie moral principle. I think most people would find it unobjectionable. Certainly we can say that intuitively, it is more plausibly true than not. The same could be said for (2). If morality is objective, then an utterly absurd and meaningless life is either good or bad, and of course it would not be a good thing. Even if morality is subjective, I hardly see anyone ascribing a value other than bad to an utterly absurd and meaningless life. In either case, an utterly absurd and meaningless life would be bad and not value-neutral. Hence, (2) is plausibly true as well. What about (3)? First, ponder what Morris calls The Endowment Thesis:

(ET) Something has meaning iff it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

As it stands, I think (ET) is false. For it is possible for a being to have intrinsic meaning—meaning not endowed by another. One thinks of Swinburne’s conception of an ontologically necessary being, whose sufficient reason and meaning is in itself, for example. So maybe we can tweak (ET) a bit:

(ET’) Something has meaning iff it is either ontologically necessary or endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive personal agent or group of such agents

Even if you don’t think an ontologically necessary being exists, (ET’) should be open for agreement to virtually everyone. Either something has intrinsic meaning or its meaning is derivative and extrinsic. The only thing which could have intrinsic meaning is an ontologically necessary being. It seems rather obvious that if there were no purposive personal agent(s) at all, then nothing would have meaning. Everything would just be. So (ET’) seems secure.

So what about (3)? If Christian theism is true, then (3) is false. What about naturalism? It is hard to say. Most, I imagine, would become indignant by such a remark. For certainly we can and do create meaning for our lives as we see fit. In fact, we greet life like this every day—we go to and fro, doing things for various purposes which thereby impart meaning to our lives. Apart from an ontologically necessary being’s endowments, any meaning would therefore come via our control. So the naturalist can reason that because (4) is true, as a consequence (3) must be false.

The problem with this is its failure to take into account the prior, ontological distinction between relative and objective or ultimate meaning. To see the difference, consider the chain of events:

E₁, E₂, E₃, … E_n

Every event leading up to E_n has meaning relative to the accomplishment of the chain itself. Once E_n is reached, the chain as a whole accrues ultimate meaning. It’s like a game of chess. Only if the game has ultimate meaning does each individual move have significance. Our lives are like the chain of events. Relative meaning is within our control. Ultimate meaning is not (either life has ultimate meaning or it does not—such seems beyond our endowing capabilities). Even though we can and do endow relative meaning to our lives, our lives as a whole remain meaningless unless it is endowed ultimate meaning. I submit that the only being capable of endowing life with ultimate meaning is an ontologically necessary being. Therefore, even if (4) is true the naturalist can’t use it to say (3) is false. Indeed, it is hard to see how the naturalist could deny (3). In fact, Morris points out that any reason supporting (3) could probably support

(6) Every human’s life is utterly absurd and meaningless

just as well, which would lead to an even more dramatic conclusion:

(7) I should rid the world of every human life

Now obviously nobody should accept this argument, and I’m not at all saying anyone should (God forbid). What I’m saying is, with Camus, the only way out of this argument for the naturalist seems to be the denial of (1). The naturalist is therefore left with saying we should not rid the world of bad things, so far as they are within our control—an unwelcome conclusion if there ever was one.

Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 4 Comments »

Prophecy as Evidence

Sunday, May 4th, 2008

Aware of the many alleged prophecies in the Bible, many Christians eagerly point to them as evidence for Christianity without realizing certain constraints under which prophecy needs to be placed in order to have evidential value. When such constraints are in place, however, I think fulfilled prophecy could serve as powerful evidence. The great atheist J. L. Mackie agrees:

[It] is worth noting that successful prophecy could be regarded as a form of miracle for which there could in principle be good evidence. If someone is reliably recorded as having prophesied at t₁ an event at t₂ which could not be predicted at t₁ on any natural grounds, and the event occurs at t₂, then at any later time t₃ we can assess the evidence for the claims both that the prophecy was made at t₁ and that its accuracy cannot be explained either causally (for example, on the ground that it brought about its own fulfillment) or as accidental, and hence that it was probably miraculous.¹

Mackie therefore seems to have the following three conditions in mind that must be met for prophecy to be regarded as evidence:

(1) The recording of the events must be historically reliable

(2) The events cannot be artificially forged or coerced into being fulfilled

(3) Fulfillment by coincidence or chance must be ruled out

Now that the proper restrictions are in place, the question can be asked, Does the Bible contain alleged fulfilled prophecy that meets conditions (1) through (3)? I think it does (if I can assert that without argument for the sake of brevity here). Another way alleged fulfilled prophecy could be used as evidence is by casting it into the form of a design argument. Consider prophecy in the context of Debmski’s so-called Generic Chance Elimination Argument²:

(1) Some event e has occurred at t₂

(2) The occurrence of e at t₂ was outside the control of human efforts

(3) e was reliably predicted at t₁ to occur at t₂

(4) The probability of the e occurring at t₂ by chance is very small

(5) The occurrence of e was only possible at t₂

(6) Given (5), the occurrence of e at t₂ remains highly improbable

(7) The probability of e occurring at t₂ by chance is highly improbable

(8) Contingent circumstances x are necessary for e to have occurred at t₂

(9) We can infer (3) from contingent circumstances x

(10) One is warranted in inferring that the occurrence of e at t₂ was not by chance

The main things to be worked out would be actually calculating the probability in (4) and elaborating on the contingent circumstances in (8). Regarding the former, the work of Peter Winebrenner Stoner and Robert C. Newman comes to mind, where they calculate the probability of individual and collective prophecies’ occurrence by chance.³ Regarding the latter, one would just need to spell out in detail what were the contingent states of affairs (people, places, events, etc.) necessary for the fulfillment of the prophecy.

By way of application, consider the triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem. This event was allegedly prophesied in Zechariah 9.9 which, replete with Messianic language, says “Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion! Shout in triumph, O daughter of Jerusalem! Behold, your king is coming to you; He is just and endowed with salvation, Humble, and mounted on a donkey, Even on a colt, the foal of a donkey.” This prophecy is taken to be fulfilled by Jesus as he triumphantly rode into Jerusalem on a donkey, evoking bystanders to rejoice greatly, shouting in triumph, “‘Hosanna! BLESSED IS HE WHO COMES IN THE NAME OF THE LORD; Blessed is the coming kingdom of our father David; Hosanna in the highest!’” (Mark 11.1-11; see also Matt 21.1-11; Luke 19.28-38; John 12.12-16). Stoner and Newman estimate the probability of this prophecy occurring by chance to be 10⁶. The contingent states of affairs necessary for the fulfillment of this prophecy would include things like a messianic figure entering Jerusalem on a donkey accompanied by the scripture-alluding shouts of the bystanders.

The triumphal entry is also a prime candidate for Mackie’s threefold criteria. (1) We have copies of the book of Zechariah predating the time of Christ by at least 100 years. Moreover, the triumphal entry recorded in Mark is very reliable, given Markan priority and the independent source of John’s account. (2) Many of the contingent states of affairs mentioned earlier were not within Jesus’ control (such as the crowd’s reaction) and so couldn’t have been forged. (3) The likelihood of this occurring by chance, as argued by Stoner and Newman, is obviously very low.
(more…)

Posted in Apologetics, Arguments for God's Existence, Christian Doctrine | 7 Comments »

(1)	I should rid the world of bad things, so far as it is in my control to do so
(2)	An utterly absurd and meaningless life is a bad thing
(3)	My life is utterly absurd and meaningless
(4)	It is within my control to rid the world of my life
(5)	Thus, I should rid the world of my life

(1)	The recording of the events must be historically reliable
(2)	The events cannot be artificially forged or coerced into being fulfilled
(3)	Fulfillment by coincidence or chance must be ruled out

(1)	Some event e has occurred at t₂
(2)	The occurrence of e at t₂ was outside the control of human efforts
(3)	e was reliably predicted at t₁ to occur at t₂
(4)	The probability of the e occurring at t₂ by chance is very small
(5)	The occurrence of e was only possible at t₂
(6)	Given (5), the occurrence of e at t₂ remains highly improbable
(7)	The probability of e occurring at t₂ by chance is highly improbable
(8)	Contingent circumstances x are necessary for e to have occurred at t₂
(9)	We can infer (3) from contingent circumstances x
(10)	One is warranted in inferring that the occurrence of e at t₂ was not by chance

Archive for May, 2008

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