Doxazo Theos

Archive for May, 2009

Virtual Identity = Reality?

Thursday, May 28th, 2009

Fictional objects, like characters and virtual worlds and their contents (e.g., vorpal swords), do not exist and are not considered objects because they do not possess a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. They are, to use Vallicella’s term, incomplete items.

Take any fictional item F. Nothing seems impossible about some master-author or programmer (call him Dr. Pruss) exhaustively describing or programming a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions for F. So we can say there is a possible world W where F does in fact have a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. So, is F a fiction in W?

Further, suppose Dr. Pruss was only able to program F in W by modeling it off his exhaustive knowledge of a real F in W, F’. In essence, F is an exact replica of F’, only F is virtual and F’ is actual, or real. It’s not like we can just say F≠F’ because it is false that (F)(F’)[(F=F’)→(α)(αF↔αF’)] where α is actual existence because the question is precisely why α applies to F’ and not F in W.

The only sensible answer I can think to give would be to say F is abstract whereas F’ is concrete in W. But if that’s the case, then the only way one can maintain that F≠F’ in W (without denying ◊F) would be to affirm the existence of abstract objects.

Posted in Philosophy | 1 Comment »

Boomerang Arguments

Monday, May 11th, 2009

A boomerang argument, according to Robert Van Gulick,

reaches across to the epistemic/cognitive/conceptual domain of facts about our representation of the world, and then swings back to reach a conclusion in the metaphysical/ontological/factual domain about the nature of reality itself. It moves from the facts about how we represent or conceptualize the world to suppose results about the necessary nature of the world itself. More specifically, boomerangs often move from supposed gaps or lacks of links in our representations or concepts of the world to conclusion about objects gaps within the world itself and ontological distinctions between the real things in it.¹

Boomerang arguments have a long and detailed history. Among the more classic examples are ontological arguments for God’s existence and various arguments for dualism. More contemporary examples include Jackson’s Mary,² Nagel’s bat,³ and Chalmers’ zombie.⁴ (I want very badly to see a paper entitled “A Zombie Bat Named Mary,” or maybe just an article about a Mary with a pet zombie bat, or a zombie named Mary with a pet bat?) One might also include indispensability arguments in mathematics. According to Mitchell O. Stokes,⁵ two of the most influential indispensability arguments, Quine and Putnam’s⁶ and van Inwagen’s,⁷ incorporate something like the following normative principle (NP):

(NP) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence, even if only in principle

The crucial thing to be worked out in (NP) is the idea of adequate replacement. Reductive paraphrases are a dime a dozen and can be offered for almost anything. However, this fact should not be taken to mean that they are at all adequate or preferable to the original expression. To show a paraphrase is inadequate, you could either (1) provide a counterexample to it that demonstrates the reduction or elimination is not successful, or (2) argue that it is counterintuitive, or at least more counterintuitive than the original. (2) is at odds with (IP). If (2) is true, then even if a paraphrase is coherent or available in principle, it still might be that one shouldn’t accept the paraphrase. (2) would not likely sway reductionists, but I think it’s a strategy that could, if employed correctly, permit rational assent to the original expression and possibly even give a burden of proof to the reductionist.

That said, here is another possible boomerang argument that utilizes (IP). Call it an indispensability argument for objective morality:

(1) Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)

(2) We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts

(3) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence

(4) Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.

(5) If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts

(6) We should believe in moral facts

And, of course, if this boomerang argument is sound, you can then throw an argument from objective morality that has a theistic spin.
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Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 12 Comments »

(1)	Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)
(2)	We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts
(3)	We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence
(4)	Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.
(5)	If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts
(6)	We should believe in moral facts

Archive for May, 2009

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