An Argument for the Trinity
Consider the first premise:
(1) A perfect being would be omnibenevolent
An omnibenevolent being displays perfect love. It is a being that is “morally perfect” or “all-loving” or “all-good”. An omnibenevolent being is surely greater than a mere benevolent one, or one not essentially benevolent at all. Surprisingly, it is this premise which seems most susceptible to attack. But if it could be established, which seems reasonable to think it could, it seems the nature of omnibenevolence would lead to a trinitarian conclusion. Crucial to omnibenevolence is the perfect exemplification of love. It is love maximally exemplified.
(2) Omnibenevolence is possible only within a community of at least three persons
What about (2)? At first this seems just arbitrary, but it actually can enjoy some support by reflecting upon the nature of love. A relational display of love is clearly superior to that of a non-relational display. For example, love between two persons is more virtuous and rich than love only concentrated inward (in fact, we have a few contumelious words to describe the later sort of love). Maybe I would even go so far as to say that perfect love is necessarily relational, involving giving and receiving. When love is not relational it is defective and incomplete; we associate undesirable attitudes with it (pride, arrogance, narcissism, etc.). If perfect love is necessarily relational, then for it to be exemplified we need more than one person. Are two persons sufficient for perfect love? Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne thinks not:
Love involves sharing, giving to the other what of one’s own is good for him and receiving from the other what of his is good for one; and love involves co-operating with another to benefit third parties. This latter is crucial for worthwhile love. There would be something deeply unsatisfactory (even if for inadequate humans sometimes unavoidable) about marriage in which the parties were concerned solely with each other and did not use their mutual love to bring forth good to others, for example by begetting, nourishing, and educating children, but possibly in other ways instead. Love must share and love must co-operate in sharing. The best love would share all that it had. (Richard Swinburne, The Christian God [Oxford, 1994], 177-178)
Perfect love, then, would seem to not only require reciprocracy, but community. Because the love between two persons could be greater (say, by inviting another to share in it), it seems then a community of three persons is sufficient for the exemplification of perfect love. Because three persons are sufficient, we needn’t posit any more. Swinburne concludes:
…perfection includes perfect love. There is something profoundly imperfect and therefore inadequately divine in a solitary divine individual. If such an individual is love, he must share, and sharing with finite beings such as humans is not sharing all of one’s nature and so is imperfect sharing. A divine individual’s love has to be manifested in a sharing with another divine individual…(Ibid, 190)
Which brings us to our conclusion
(3) Therefore, a perfect being must be composed of at least three persons
March 6th, 2008 at 2:02 pm
I guess my question would be why does the omnibenevolent being need to BE three persons? The perfect, omnibenevolent being would perhaps most obviously show its perfection by expressing its benevolence among more than one, simple “other” but how is it necessary that the being be COMPOSED of at least three persons? Especially if all three persons share an identity? Wouldn’t it be more benevolent to love someone or something totally other than itself? Other than something it stands in an identical relationship with? And wouldn’t all three of those persons share an identical omnibenevolence? How benevolent is it to love an identically omnibenevolent being?
Most of those questions are totally rhetorical, and I think you could make perfectly sensible arguments in response. I’m thinking along the lines that any one of those beings could not even BE omnibenevolent without an other that it eternally relates to. As for the question of loving an other who is not benevolent being the ultimate show of benevolence, well, that covers a triune God taking on the task of creation.
I don’t know if you’re Catholic or not, but there’s an interesting book about Maximillian Kolbe’s theory of the trinity entitled “Immaculate Conception and the Holy Spirit” that deals with some trinitarian issues.
Cool post.
March 7th, 2008 at 2:05 am
This is a great question; very perceptive on that assumption! The reason why there has to be a single divine being (though I prefer the word nature—see my earlier post on the Trinity to see why) composed of three persons is because it is ontologically impossible to have more than one divine being. A perfect being would exist of ontological necessity; that is, would be such that there is no cause active or permissive of its existence at any time. But as Swinburne points out, if such a being “is the creator and sustainer of any universe there may be, any other substance can only exist if he is, at least in part, the cause of its existence. Hence there cannot be …another such.” (Richard Swinburne, The Christian God [Oxford, 1994], 170). But no such problem looms for one ontologically necessary being composed of three persons.
These are excellent questions to ask unitarian conceptions of the Trinity (modalism, monarchianism, or sabellianism), which depict a strict identity between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The three are really a single being who assumes one of the three titles depending on the role he steps into. But the model of the Trinity I’m assuming (linked to above) has each member of the Trinity a distinct individual and therefore not identical. Each member has their own center of consciousness, counting them as distinct persons. You ask the fascinating question, “Wouldn’t all three of those persons share an identical omnibenevolence?” I would say not, for the Father’s love would be distinct from the Son’s love and the Holy Spirit’s love, and so on. Each person’s love, by itself, is not perfect. But because of the tripartite unity of each members’ love, the single divine nature exemplifies the property of omnibenevolence.
I’m not Catholic (in the traditional sense of the word), but I’ll look into Kolbe’s theory. I appreciate the reference and great comments!
March 10th, 2008 at 12:06 pm
Firstly, great post and response. I’ve heard some of this argument before, but never engaged in a good dialogue on it.
“Wouldn’t it be more benevolent to love someone or something totally other than itself? Other than something it stands in an identical relationship with?”
The problem with this notion is that if one measures love in regard to proportion or distinctiveness of the ones loved. Then one might imagine an infinitely ascending scale of new beings and more beings that could be recipients of this love. Love so defined would not and could not ever reach the “omni” status. Perfect love at least on some level has to be understood to be perfect on the hypothetical level (i.e. if being X existed then being X would be the recipient of perfect love from God). God doesn’t necessisarily have to generate being X in order to ascend to the omnibenevolent status.
One might imagine though that a being so full of love probably isn’t content to keep love interpersonal (literally in this instance, between the personalities entailed therin). This lends itself to an understanding of why God might have created… specifically why He might have made humanity with the dreadful ability to choose the relationship with God over self-love.
March 10th, 2008 at 2:45 pm
Chad:
Just for clarification, the book about Kolbe’s views mostly treat his Marian theology as it relates to the Holy Spirit’s person in the trinity. Nonetheless, it discusses the Trinity, and I couldn’t help think of it as I read you post.
Ben:
I agree that is there is an all loving god, then he love would be so central to the divine nature that he would choose to create. That would be the only thing it would make sense for a loving god to do– create life.
March 30th, 2008 at 12:47 am
The Father gives the Holy Spirit, His love, to the Son. And that love is everything the Father has. But since God is simple, whatever God has, God is. And so the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son.
April 28th, 2008 at 12:14 am
I don’t understand the logical distinction between a being and a person…Any distinction seems semantical.
April 28th, 2008 at 12:18 am
The word “thing” can be used to describe any existing being. Just as a rock is a being of some kind, so is a person. But surely there are differences between a rock. What kind of differences, and how significant are they? This obviously depends on one’s world view. But surely you wouldn’t be comfortable saying the difference between your mom and the color red or cow manure is mere semantics.
So if there are semantic ambiguities, it’s by the use of the word ‘thing.’ Logical distinctions arise when we distinguish between two more kinds of things. The most basic distinction among beings is that property and substance. Some philosophers have argued for a third type of being that is needed if one is to have an ontology resourceful enough to make proper distinctions among every existing thing, called property-things (a.k.a. ordered aggregates, structured stuff, bare matter).
If you grab an intro philosophy text it will likely have a chapter on general ontology, which would provide more details.