Doxazo Theos

Evil’s Twin Brother

December 1st, 2009

Some have claimed that the problem of evil for theism has, ironically, an evil twin brother for non-theism: the problem of goodness. If evil seems odd or out of place in a theistic universe, then goodness seems equally out of place in a Godless universe.

T and N are theism and naturalism, respectively. G is goodness, or anything the opposite of evil. Altruism, aesthetic and sense-based pleasures, love and other virtues, etc. are all broad instances of G. A naive probability application of our question is whether the expectation of G is greater on T than N, or Pr(T|G) > Pr(N|G). That we should expect G on T is not at all surprising. In The Existence of God, Swinburne quotes Mark Wynn as observing that nature is ‘uniformly beautiful whereas the products of human beings are rarely beautiful in the absence of artistic intent.” And this seems true. In a mindless universe, there is no beauty. The real question is whether we should expect G on N.

Barring the objectivity of G, any account of G on N will be a story involving G’s being a great-making property for an evolving organism. Physical, sense-based pleasures aren’t hard to account for, as an organism is likely to gravitate toward what feels ‘good’ and away from what doesn’t. But I have a hard time coming up with just-so stories accounting for aesthetic sensibilities and the desire for cultivation of genuine virtues as opposed to the mere appearance of virtues.

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Live Free or Die Hard: There Is No Missing Body

December 1st, 2009

In his forthcoming article “Resurrecting the Logical Problem of Evil,” Nathan Hanna purports to “offer a version of the Logical Argument from Evil that is immune to the Free Will Defense.” This would be significant, as most judge the FWD to have decisively solved the logical problem of evil. Hanna argues as follows (forgive the lengthy quotations. I’m after a quick and dirty reply, not necessarily an elegant one). Where “E can be all moral evil or a particular instance of or type of moral evil” and “G is free will or whatever other important goods free will might be necessary to obtain”:

(1) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect

(2) E exists

(3) If God exists and E exists, God has not eliminated E while securing G (necessary truth)

(4) So, God has not eliminated E while securing G (1, 2, 3)

(5) If God has not eliminated E while securing G, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so (premise)

(6) So, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so (4, 5)

(7) There are possible worlds where this can be done and where God would do so

(8) So, there are possible worlds where God is more morally praiseworthy than he in fact is (6, 7)

(9) Being more morally praiseworthy than a morally perfect being is logically impossible (premise)

(10) Contradiction (8, 9)

If 5, 7 and 9 are necessarily true, 1 and 2 are inconsistent. Since 2 is obviously true, it would follow that 1 – theism – is false.

The crucial premise, it seems to me, is (5). Hanna defends (5) as follows. Imagine the moral status of a hero, H, depending on which action he performs in Thomas Nagel’s rescue scenario:

“However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him.” Hanna further quote Nagel as saying “What has been done, and what is morally judged is partly determined by external factors.” External factors are “beyond [H]’s control, factors like the choices of others.” Hanna writes:

“If [H] manages to rescue him, [H] will arguably be more morally praiseworthy than [H] would have been [H] she failed. [H] will have accomplished something that affects one’s moral standing significantly. But [H’s] prospects depend on something beyond [H’s] complete control: the other person’s choices.”

So Hanna sets up a scenario that places God in the same situation with respect to the rescue of his free creatures from evil. He writes:

What acts God manages to perform – whether he eliminates evil, say – depends partly on his creatures’ free choices. In this respect, God bears important relations to us that we bear to one another. The acts we manage to perform depend on factors beyond our control, among them others’ free choices. Our moral standing depends partly on the acts we perform. Our moral standing therefore depends partly on what others do. This is a kind of moral luck. If moral luck is real and God stands in the appropriate relations to his free creatures, his moral standing depends partly on what those creatures freely do. But then evil’s existence threatens theism in a way that has been overlooked. How so? … God could succeed in eliminating evil and securing the relevant goods with sufficient cooperation from his free creatures. Succeeding at this endeavor would be a significant moral accomplishment. But whether God does this is not entirely within his control. It depends on his creatures’ free choices. Success at such cooperative endeavors affects the moral standing of those involved. This is an example of moral luck.

Whether … H can rescue someone from a burning building and whether God can…rescue his free creatures from evil depends on factors beyond their control. Among these factors are the choices of others. Whether H can rescue someone depends partly on whether the person helps or hinders her.

God bears relevantly similar relations to us that H bears to the person she tries to rescue. So, similar things can be said about God and H depending on their success or failure. Being morally perfect, God would want to rescue us and he would try to do so. Moreover, he must succeed. If God succeeds, he will accomplish something amazing, something that, like H’s successful rescue, bears the marks of an action that significantly affects one’s moral standing. If he fails, however, then, just like H would be if she failed at her rescue attempt, he will not be as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he succeeded – even if he is nevertheless very morally praiseworthy. So (5) seems true. … To rescue us is to eliminate evil while securing great goods. If evil exists, God has not done this.

The crux of the matter is the middle paragraph. It seems to me that Hanna’s argument stands or falls on the notion of “control.” Unfortunately Hanna doesn’t say much about this. A free will defender might be a molinist, in which case there is a relevant sense in which the actions of free agents are within God’s complete control: God chose to create a world in which agents act freely in the circumstances God knew they would. Moreover, the actual world could be a world, perhaps the only world, where the securing of G would have optimal consequences: say, a world in which God’s divinely inspired message is freely dispersed and, as a result, as most as possible are saved and as few as possible are lost. Therefore, if molinism is true, it is false that God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he not eliminated E while securing G.

Therefore, it remains safe to point out the tomb in which the corpse of the logical argument of evil has been finally placed—The Nature of Necessity.

Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 2 Comments »

Dualism and Quantitative Intuitions

November 3rd, 2009

Many important starting points and conclusions in philosophy rest on simple intuitions—non-inferential, non-sense-experiential seemings. Not every case of intuition has evidential value, but the great majority of philosophers are prepared to defend the claim that intuition provides prima facie evidence regarding the natures of real things in the world and not merely our concepts. So it is especially interesting when one finds oneself with conflicting intuitions. For example, I have a strong intuition that

(1) Human persons, considered individually, seem to be more than just physical organisms

which implies a kind of dualism. But I don’t have the intuition that

(2) Human persons, considered individually, seem to be (or have) immaterial substances

which may just be peculiar to me. Anyway, something like (1) and (2) is a very common and, I think, strong intuition. Human persons, considered qua individuals (or even in small or personal groups), impresses upon my mind that there is something about them more fundamental than matter. But I also find myself with the intuition that

(3) Human persons, considered collectively, seem to be just physical organisms

and, even more accurately,

(4) Human persons, considered collectively, do not seem to be more than just physical organisms

I don’t know if there’s as significant a difference between (3) and (4) as there is between (1) and (2), but (4) does seem more intuitively true to me than (3). When I survey large crowds of people, such as in sporting events or other mass public gatherings, it is not just easy for me to see them as just a collection of physical organisms, like insect gatherings, but they also seem to be no more than such. The intuition is even stronger upon viewing crowds in disaster situations, where many of them are squashed and/or are at the mercy of forces larger than they (also like insects). Maybe the intuition underlying (4) is the same as the one that suggests that any view that implies insects and lower life forms have souls doesn’t seem right. But then maybe what I am really intuiting in (1) is that human persons are fundamentally not like insects (surprise!), despite the perspectival similarities I can make between swarms of people and swarms of insects, which could be the source of the intuition behind (3) and (4).

Posted in Uncategorized | 5 Comments »

Temporal Meaning and Naturalism

October 10th, 2009

Where ‘meaning’ is what we refer to that makes things worth doing, I think this is true:

(1) x is meaningful to or for S only if x is possibly satisfiable

I have not thought of any arguments for or against (1), but I think it has strong intuitive support. It is the intuition that underlies inaction after missing a deadline (think of any example you like). Applying (1) to life and meaning itself, I think we have an argument against naturalism. It would go something like:

(2) Meaning for the naturalist is not possibly satisfiable

But more needs to be said about what ‘meaning’ means here. There are the familiar objective and subjective senses of ‘meaning.’ I do not see how naturalism can warrant objective meaning to life. Most naturalists would agree. But whether there is subjective meaning in any non-trivial sense under naturalism is up for debate. I think that in order for subjective meaning to ultimately mean anything, it must be consonant with what is objectively meaningful. But suppose naturalists are justified in believing that subjective meaning is possibly satisfiable. Perhaps a third sense of meaning, of which subjective meaning is a species, reveals a defeater for this belief.

Any reflective person has been struck by the finitude of life. Looking forward in one’s youth, 80 or so years seems, well, a lifetime away. In retrospect however 80 years seems to reduce to but a breath. There is a connection between meaning and time, as we all judge what is worthwhile according to what is worth our while. The ‘worth’ is subjectively meaningful, though perhaps consonant with what is objectively meaningful. But ideally, the subjective ‘worth’ appropriately corresponds to the temporal ‘while’ it took to achieve it. Hence, we say we ‘waste our time,’ while we do things not worth doing. When worth and while are combined (though not necessarily appropriately correspondent), call this temporal meaning.

I am inclined to say that naturalism gives more meaning to temporal meaning than theism. Life in a naturalist worldview is not just finite; it is absolutely final. The moments that together constitute your life are the only moments you will have. Every passing breath brings you closer to the finality of death; annihilation. Thus, naturalists would seem to have a stronger impetus to make more worth their while than theists, because any time wasted is gone forever. It would be wasted life in the most literal sense possible. While I am inclined to say that naturalism gives more meaning to temporal meaning than theism, I’m not convinced this is a good thing.

My intuition backing premise (2) is the following. It’s almost as if each moment for the naturalist is so pregnant and infused with temporal meaning that it would be impossible to satisfy them. The worth could never appropriately correspond to the while because there is literally nothing worth as much as the while. Constantly asking “How could I make the very most out of every moment of my life” would surely result in despair. To not be preoccupied with the question is to simply not understand what’s at stake, for only a fool would plunder something of that value—the most valuable thing possible—one’s own life. Ironically, too much meaning might result in meaninglessness.

(3) Therefore, meaning is not meaningful for the naturalist

Posted in Uncategorized | 6 Comments »

Decisively Refuted by 50 Cent

September 16th, 2009

Pondering the problem of how one accounts for the necessary existence of abstract entities such as musical pieces, works of art, novels, etc., I once thought that such entities could very well be types in the mind of God, very much like what Augustine referred to as divine ideas. So when Beethoven composed the 9^th symphony or Dostoyevsky wrote The Brothers Karamazov, we can’t say Beethoven or Dostoyevsky literally created these works, but merely tokened them. I was satisfied with this explanation until I heard the most vile, farcical mockery of music come through the air waves: “Shorty you ain’t gotta take your panties off just pull em to the side / If you wanna ride on the roller coaster baby come and ride.” Repulsed by the idea that this “song” could possibly exist as a type in the mind of God, I immediately jettisoned the view.

I’m sure I hold many philosophically-naive views, but I doubt I’ll ever experience such an immediate and decisive refutation as that ever again.

Posted in Philosophy | 3 Comments »

Theistic Conceptualism

June 25th, 2009

A version of theistic conceptualism can be distilled by conjoining three independently defensible theses, where ‘objects of kind F‘ are those typically characterized as abstract (numbers, properties, propositions, etc.):

Necessary Existence Thesis: There are necessarily existent objects of kind F

One over Many Thesis: Objects of kind F are tokenable types

Conceptualism Simpliciter: Objects of kind F are mental (conceptual) particulars

The resultant thesis would be very appealing. On the one hand, it would welcome many of the strongest realist arguments in favor of the Necessary Existence Thesis. On the other hand, Conceptualism Simpliciter would accommodate many strong nominalist strategies by avoiding commitment to a bloated or tripartite ontology of abstract objects. This is to say nothing of the merit of the actual arguments for the theses themselves, which I think are a good many.

Of course, many peoples’ strongest motivation for resisting this line would be that the resultant thesis would be explicitly theistic, where objects of kind F are grounded in a necessarily existent mind. But that’s not my problem.

Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 1 Comment »

Virtual Identity = Reality?

May 28th, 2009

Fictional objects, like characters and virtual worlds and their contents (e.g., vorpal swords), do not exist and are not considered objects because they do not possess a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. They are, to use Vallicella’s term, incomplete items.

Take any fictional item F. Nothing seems impossible about some master-author or programmer (call him Dr. Pruss) exhaustively describing or programming a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions for F. So we can say there is a possible world W where F does in fact have a complete set of compossible properties serving as determinate identity conditions. So, is F a fiction in W?

Further, suppose Dr. Pruss was only able to program F in W by modeling it off his exhaustive knowledge of a real F in W, F’. In essence, F is an exact replica of F’, only F is virtual and F’ is actual, or real. It’s not like we can just say F≠F’ because it is false that (F)(F’)[(F=F’)→(α)(αF↔αF’)] where α is actual existence because the question is precisely why α applies to F’ and not F in W.

The only sensible answer I can think to give would be to say F is abstract whereas F’ is concrete in W. But if that’s the case, then the only way one can maintain that F≠F’ in W (without denying ◊F) would be to affirm the existence of abstract objects.

Posted in Philosophy | 1 Comment »

Boomerang Arguments

May 11th, 2009

A boomerang argument, according to Robert Van Gulick,

reaches across to the epistemic/cognitive/conceptual domain of facts about our representation of the world, and then swings back to reach a conclusion in the metaphysical/ontological/factual domain about the nature of reality itself. It moves from the facts about how we represent or conceptualize the world to suppose results about the necessary nature of the world itself. More specifically, boomerangs often move from supposed gaps or lacks of links in our representations or concepts of the world to conclusion about objects gaps within the world itself and ontological distinctions between the real things in it.¹

Boomerang arguments have a long and detailed history. Among the more classic examples are ontological arguments for God’s existence and various arguments for dualism. More contemporary examples include Jackson’s Mary,² Nagel’s bat,³ and Chalmers’ zombie.⁴ (I want very badly to see a paper entitled “A Zombie Bat Named Mary,” or maybe just an article about a Mary with a pet zombie bat, or a zombie named Mary with a pet bat?) One might also include indispensability arguments in mathematics. According to Mitchell O. Stokes,⁵ two of the most influential indispensability arguments, Quine and Putnam’s⁶ and van Inwagen’s,⁷ incorporate something like the following normative principle (NP):

(NP) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence, even if only in principle

The crucial thing to be worked out in (NP) is the idea of adequate replacement. Reductive paraphrases are a dime a dozen and can be offered for almost anything. However, this fact should not be taken to mean that they are at all adequate or preferable to the original expression. To show a paraphrase is inadequate, you could either (1) provide a counterexample to it that demonstrates the reduction or elimination is not successful, or (2) argue that it is counterintuitive, or at least more counterintuitive than the original. (2) is at odds with (IP). If (2) is true, then even if a paraphrase is coherent or available in principle, it still might be that one shouldn’t accept the paraphrase. (2) would not likely sway reductionists, but I think it’s a strategy that could, if employed correctly, permit rational assent to the original expression and possibly even give a burden of proof to the reductionist.

That said, here is another possible boomerang argument that utilizes (IP). Call it an indispensability argument for objective morality:

(1) Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)

(2) We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts

(3) We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence

(4) Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.

(5) If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts

(6) We should believe in moral facts

And, of course, if this boomerang argument is sound, you can then throw an argument from objective morality that has a theistic spin.
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Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 12 Comments »

An Argument for Conceptualism

April 7th, 2009

Perhaps the widely accepted distinction between abstracta and concreta is fundamentally misguided and has overshadowed an illuminating fact about the nature of entities of the former kind (numbers, properties, propositions, etc.). Letting F represent such entities, (or objects, no distinction is being drawn here), a simple argument for conceptualism might run as follows:

(1) Fs are either abstract or concrete entities

(2) Fs are not abstract entities

(3) Therefore, Fs are concrete entities

(4) If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical or conceptual particulars

(5) Fs are not physical particulars

(6) Therefore, Fs are conceptual particulars

The two important premises are (2) and (5). (4) is actually uncontroversial, because mental events, states, etc. are almost always understood as particulars (though I suppose this would need some explanation). (5) might bring some resistance from hard-core empiricists or physicalists, but nothing I don’t think can be overcome. What about (2)? Here are some strategies. First, you could argue that all accounts that have tried to offer a distinction between abstract and concrete fail. Second, (2) might offer a simpler ontology and avoid, at a single stroke, all the arguments against abstract objects (thus welcoming many anti-realist or anti-platonist strategies aimed at objects so conceived). Third, you could apply an identity criterion to certain objects, turning them into particulars. Hale notes this:

For suppose Fs to be incapable of spatial location. A fortiori it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. Thus Fs are not abstract, but concrete. This particular objection could be silenced by amending the criterion to: Fs are concrete objects if and only if a is the same F as b only if a and b enjoy the same spatial location at any time. But this suffers from the opposite defect: for we shall surely wish to regard mental events, states, etc. as concrete objects, but will now only be able to do so by insisting upon the truth of physicalism (Abstract Objects [Basil Blackwell, 1987], p. 57).

Hale completely overlooks conceptualism as an option to solve this dilemma. A conceptualist needn’t conced anything to physicalism. However, this latter strategy would cause some difficulties for exemplification (how can redness, as a particular, be instantiated in multiple objects?). But this could be easily resolved by seeing Fs not as particulars, but universal concepts, which could be multiply instantiated (say, by an omniscient mind). Slightly altering the premises, then:

(4’) If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical particulars or universal concepts

(6’) Therefore, Fs are universal concepts

And here we would have not only an argument for conceptualism, but a conceptualist argument for God.

Posted in Arguments for God's Existence, Philosophy | 6 Comments »

Degrees of Ontological Commitment

April 5th, 2009

Three terms can be used to indicate degrees of ontological commitment: item, entity, and object. ‘Item’ is ontologically neutral or noncommittal, whereas both entity and object are committal but in different ways. This is not to say things can exist in degrees; it is only to indicate with precision one’s ontological commitment to the thing in question. E. J. Lowe defines ‘object’ as an entity possessing determinate identity conditions. By ‘determinate identity conditions,’ I think Lowe means a complete set of compossible properties. So an ‘object’ is an entity possessing a complete set of compossible properties. Waves and particles, for example, would not be considered objects under this definition because they lack determinate identity conditions. Certain quantum phenomena indicate that particles can exemplify contradictory properties simultaneously. And because waves undergo constant flux, no one wave can exist at two times. Determinate identity conditions also rule out fuzzy, vague, or incomplete items as objects as well. William Vallicella defines an incomplete item as follows:

X is incomplete =_df there is a property F-ness such that x is neither F nor non-F.

Vallicella adds that “an incomplete item, then, is one that is indeterminate with respect to one or more properties.” An incomplete item would be something like a fictional character or concept, because they only have properties predicated of them by their creators (E.g., What is Homer Simpson’s shoe size?) Properties not predicated of fictional characters have no truth value, and so cannot have identity conditions. Given that incomplete items are indeterminate, they cannot be objects. But incomplete items could be entities. The difference between a fictional item and an incomplete entity is actual existence. It is therefore convenient to define ‘entity’ simpliciter as that which exists but does not have determinate identity conditions.

In sum, all entities and objects are necessarily items, but all items are not necessarily entities or objects. Moreover, all objects are entities, but not all entities are objects. Existence is a necessary condition for entities and objects, but only a sufficient condition for items. The next step would be applying these distinctions to abstract and concrete items.

Posted in Philosophy | No Comments »

(1)	God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect
(2)	E exists
(3)	If God exists and E exists, God has not eliminated E while securing G (necessary truth)
(4)	So, God has not eliminated E while securing G (1, 2, 3)
(5)	If God has not eliminated E while securing G, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so (premise)
(6)	So, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so (4, 5)
(7)	There are possible worlds where this can be done and where God would do so
(8)	So, there are possible worlds where God is more morally praiseworthy than he in fact is (6, 7)
(9)	Being more morally praiseworthy than a morally perfect being is logically impossible (premise)
(10)	Contradiction (8, 9)

(1)	Many of the nonphilosophical propositions we believe can be expressed – or imply propositions that can be expressed – by there being moral facts (that is, the proposition that there are moral facts, or equivalently, that moral facts exist)
(2)	We cannot reasonably give up all of the nonphilosophical beliefs which are expressed in ways that imply the existence of moral facts
(3)	We shouldn’t use a sentence to express one of our beliefs if we knowingly reject any of its apparent implications, at least not without having an idea of how we can adequately replace it with another sentence
(4)	Of those nonphilosophical beliefs that are expressed by sentences which refer to moral facts, we cannot plausibly argue that all of them can be adequately expressed by sentences that do not refer to moral facts; reference to moral facts is indispensable.
(5)	If (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true then we should believe in moral facts
(6)	We should believe in moral facts

(1)	Fs are either abstract or concrete entities
(2)	Fs are not abstract entities
(3)	Therefore, Fs are concrete entities
(4)	If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical or conceptual particulars
(5)	Fs are not physical particulars
(6)	Therefore, Fs are conceptual particulars

(4’)	If Fs are concrete entities, they are either physical particulars or universal concepts
(6’)	Therefore, Fs are universal concepts

Doxazo Theos

Chad A. McIntosh

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